This paper studies how investment expertise and networks of university board members are linked to endowment investment performance. Harnessing detailed information on 11,019 board members for 579 universities, we find that more expertise in alternative assets (hedge funds, private equity and venture capital) and larger professional networks lead to higher allocations to alternatives and better investment results, even after controlling for risk. Expertise and networks appear particularly important in private equity and venture capital which are especially difficult to analyze and manage. The improved investment performance comes through a number of channels: capturing higher returns that can accompany alternative assets in general, greater ability to select or have access to high performing managers and being able to use direct funds rather than funds of funds which impose an extra layer of fees. Our results suggest that endowments directly benefit from having experts in alternative investments serving on university boards.
In this paper, we provide the first study of whether the investment expertise and networks resident in university governance affect endowments' allocations to assets and resulting returns. We pay particular attention to alternative assets (hedge funds, private equity and venture capital) for which skill and contacts may be especially important.
We collect information on 11,019 unique individuals matched with 579 endowments to construct novel measures of board members' expertise in investments and networks in business. We develop granular measures related to specific investment areas (e.g., asset management of public securities, hedge funds, private equity, and venture capital). We also survey endowments asking specific questions about governance and the investment process.
Our analysis uncovers several features of university endowment investments.
First, we document the substantial shift to alternative assets which is especially pronounced for larger endowments. For endowments with assets above one billion dollars, the average allocation to alternatives is almost fifty percent.
Second, we show that university endowments, on average, have strong investment returns.
They outperform simple passive strategies in public markets. This return advantage is most notable for larger endowments. Moreover, this effect is not simply due to taking on higher levels of risk; endowment portfolios have higher returns per unit risk as expressed in higher Sharpe Ratios. We also find that endowments, on average, outperform benchmarks based on their asset allocation weights, suggesting that they generate extra returns from active management. Overall, our results suggest that, on average, endowments (especially large endowments) have earned higher total returns due to investing in alternative assets. Part of the return increase is due to harvesting higher returns in an asset class (e.g., a liquidity premium in alternative assets) and part is due to active management within an asset class.
Third, we show notable differences across endowments in the expertise and networks resident in their governing bodies. We find that more expertise in alternative assets goes along with higher allocations to those assets. This effect is true even after controlling for endowment size. Moreover, the nature of expertise appears granular; expertise in hedge funds matters for allocations to hedge funds, whereas expertise in private equity or venture capital matters most for that specific area. Consistent with this pattern, we find that having a CIO is positively linked to allocations to private equity and venture capital, both of which involve complexities such as managing capital calls and dealing with illiquidity. For hedge funds, however, the presence of a CIO is not linked to allocations. These findings across hedge funds, private equity, and venture capital are consistent with the relative difficulty of managing and accessing these alternative asset classes.
Fourth, in addition to expertise, we find that professional connections (networks) matter, especially for allocations to private equity and venture capital. This is consistent with being able to overcome restrictions or barriers to investing in funds that might otherwise be difficult or impossible to access.
Fifth, the extra returns experienced by endowments are related to investment expertise.
In addition to being linked to asset allocations, expertise leads to higher "selection" returns within alternative assets, that is, extra returns having controlled for benchmarks of average performance in an asset class. The importance of expertise emerges even after controlling for endowment size and is particularly notable in venture capital. This is consistent with the importance of access to high performing venture capital partnerships.
Finally, we provide evidence on specific parts of the investment process. We find that expertise affects how endowments navigate choices between direct funds and funds of funds.
Endowments with more expertise resident in their boards are more likely to use direct funds to invest in alternative assets, rather than funds of funds which have an additional layer of intermediation and fees. This is consistent with an increased ability to understand and access direct funds. Further, our survey reveals that participants in the investment process (e.g. senior staff of endowments) benefit from more knowledgeable and better-connected governance bodies, citing more frequent recommendations of and access to alternative investment funds, especially those that might be restricted or closed. This confirms a prominent role for expertise and networks.
Overall, our results indicate that endowments likely benefit from seeking out investment experts to serve on governing bodies. The potential benefits seem highest in areas such as private equity and venture capital, where investments are often harder to analyze and access.
We proceed as follows. Section 1 discusses endowments and related research. Section 2 discusses data sources and endowment characteristics, including asset allocations, returns and measures of expertise and networks. Sections 3 and 4 study how asset allocations and returns, respectively, are affected by investment expertise and networks. Section 5 examines some specific channels for effects on the investment process, including the results of our endowment survey on the topic. Finally, section 6 concludes.
University Endowments and Past Research
University endowments make headlines every year when they report asset allocations and returns. On behalf of their schools, these endowments in the U.S. collectively manage over half a trillion dollars (2015) and annually spend 4 to 5 percent of this aggregate wealth on, among other things, scholarships for students, support for faculty, and investments in infrastructure for teaching and research. Endowments' investment performance is thus vital for the future of what schools strive to accomplish.
These endowments provide an especially good laboratory for research on institutional investing and are often viewed as innovators in investment management. They typically have a long term (infinite) investment horizon, limited restrictions on asset choice, and favorable tax status which may reduce frictions. Moreover, endowment decisions are less likely to be influenced by external political forces or other constraints facing many large institutional investors. This is the first study to examine the links between asset allocations and returns and measures of investment expertise and networks that reside in endowment governance. This expertise and networks may be especially important for alternative assets to which endowments often make large allocations. For instance, studying the boards of pension funds, Andonov et al. (2018) find that the lack of financial experience on the board contributes to poor investment performance. Moreover, pensions whose boards have a high fraction of government officials have lower returns within investment categories, such as real estate and venture capital, likely due to political pressures favoring certain (sub-optimal) investments. Studying private equity, Cavagnaro et al. (2017) find that more institutional investors (limited partner investors in private equity) do consistently better or worse (relative to median returns) than can be explained without the presence of differential skill among the private equity managers. Other research focusing on private equity also suggests an important role for expertise. Lerner et al. (2008) find that large endowments' shift towards alternative investments was accompanied by higher returns, and conclude that top endowments have superior ability to select and access managers. They caution, however, against a simple mimicking strategy of higher allocations to private equity since success may depend on an endowment having the ability to select and access high performing funds. Sensoy et al. (2014) also examine private equity and find that endowments enjoyed superior returns over the 1991-1998 period. They attribute this advantage to access to high-performing venture capital funds. After 1998, however, the authors find that endowments' advantages disappear and that other institutional limited partners do just as well investing in private equity. Sensoy et al. (2014) attribute this erosion of endowments' advantages to a maturation of the private equity industry.
Academic research on endowment portfolio performance is limited (Barber and Wang (2013) , Brown et al. (2010) ). Studying the 1991-2011 period, Barber and Wang (2013) conclude that university endowments do not exhibit any ability to beat high level benchmarks through selection or timing skills. They conclude that "elite" institutions (e.g. Ivy League and high SAT level schools) benefit from higher returns on alternative assets (e.g. due to high allocations) but do not earn any extra returns over and above private asset benchmarks. Barber and Wang (2013) do not, however, develop specific measures of expertise and networks.
Moreover, their methodology relies on ex-post estimates of portfolio weights to earn returns over a past period, not actual investment weights put in place at the beginning of a period.
While not directly addressing endowment performance, there is also limited research on the impact of financial and income shocks on endowment spending and asset allocation (see, for example, Brown et al. (2014) , Dimmock (2012) , Rosen and Sappington (2016) ). None of this prior research, however, uses specific measures of skill or networks such as we develop.
In this paper, we focus on expertise and networks inherent in governing boards. The governance of endowments may have a number of effects including spending policy, appetite for risk, and effectiveness in executing strategy. Our focus is on how the investment expertise and networks resident in a university's governance affects allocations to various assets and the resultant returns. Schools have adopted different plans for governing endowments but most share some common features. The typical governance structure includes a Board of Trustees that specifies spending policies, broader fund objectives, and delegates responsibilities.
Responsibilities are often given to an investment committee, often a subset of the larger trustee board, which sets investment policy and risk limits. In turn, the investment committee often further delegates investment and operational power to a management staff. For larger endowments, the investment committee may delegate substantial discretion to a full-time staff that includes a Chief Investment Officer (CIO) and a range of investment professionals.
In small endowments, there may be few or no professional staff with investment expertise, and the investment committee itself remains closely involved with details of the investment process, often working with a consultant. Endowments typically create an Investment Policy Statement codifying key features of endowment policy. 1 1 A number of surveys and analysis of governance structures are available from industry sources, including NACUBO, Cambridge Associates, and the Greenwich Roundtable. Some universities set up the endowment as a separate management company with its own separate board. Some have blended models that outsource staff responsibilities to another firm which has a Chief Investment Officer and professional staff.
Data Sources and Endowment Characteristics

Data Sources
Data on returns and allocations come from comprehensive annual surveys of higher education endowments by the National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO).
2 These provide an individual endowment's overall annual return and detail on its asset allocation. Some endowments also report annual returns by asset class (e.g.
for private equity). In addition, NACUBO reports an array of data such as the endowment's size, spending rate, whether it is public or private and whether it employs a Chief Investment 
Endowment Characteristics
NACUBO data illustrate key features of the endowment landscape: large differences among schools in assets under management, in investment patterns and in returns. A few endowments have assets above $10 billion but the simple average across the NACUBO sample is just over $500 million, and the median figure is around $100 million. Another feature of endowment investing is differences in return patterns across endowments, not surprising given their different allocation patterns. Figure 2 plots average returns for three size groups of endowments. As comparison, it also shows the return from avoiding alternatives altogether with a passive strategy of U.S. stocks (50% in SP500), fixed income (30% in JP Morgan Bond Index) and international equity (20% in MSCI ACWI). Figure 2 shows that all size groupings of endowments had higher returns than this passive strategy.
Moreover, the difference in returns between large and small endowments is striking: large funds outperform their smaller peers by over 2 percent annually and have an even larger spread over the passive strategy. Panel C provides insights on endowment returns. The first row parallels patterns shown in Figure 2 . The average endowment return is 7.35% which rises to 9.66% on an asset weighted basis due to the higher returns of large endowments. Panel B also presents Sharpe ratios measuring returns per unit risk (as described in the appendix). The Sharpe ratio of 0.82 on an asset weighted basis is higher than the simple average of 0.64, suggesting that the higher returns of larger endowments are not simply the result of taking on higher portfolio risks.
We caution, however, that measures of portfolio risk are notoriously difficult when private assets are involved. Quoted values for private assets are often stale, may be measured with substantial error and can present a "smoothed" version of the actual risk in the asset class.
As described in the appendix, we take explicit steps to adjust risk measures for these features but acknowledge their limitations.
Finally, Panel D of 
Asset Allocations by University Endowments
To investigate endowments' asset allocations we use a pooled regression with fixed effects for time, geography and whether the school is public or private as given below:
where y it represents the allocation to an asset class expressed as a percentage of total assets (e.g., to domestic equity or to venture capital) by endowment i at time t. We cluster standard errors at the endowment level to allow for correlation in the error term over time for a given fund. Expertise and network are measures of the financial expertise and networks resident in the endowment's governing board.
In some specifications we include controls for the size of the endowment (the natural logarithm of total assets), whether the endowment has a full-time CIO (zero-one dummy coded 1 for a CIO), the size of the endowment's professional staff (natural logarithm of number of full time equivalents, and the size of the governing board (natural logarithm of the number of members Without controlling for size, investment expertise in both asset management (public securities) and alternative assets are linked to lower allocations to domestic equity. Once size and other control variables are added, the effects of expertise are not significant, revealing the correlation between expertise and asset size. The significant negative coefficients on size shows that larger endowments allocate less to domestic equity: this is the flip side of higher allocations to alternatives seen in Figure 1 . For fixed income, the patterns are similar to those of domestic equity, with one exception. The exception is that public institutions allocate more to fixed income (1.63 percent more) than do privates. This higher allocation may reflect tighter constraints on investment alternatives or on risk taking behavior.
Overall, the results in Table 2 suggest measures of investment expertise, if anything, are negatively linked to allocations to traditional asset classes such as stocks and bonds. Once one controls for the size of the endowment, expertise has no significant effect. These patterns are consistent with recent trends in investment strategies, whereby cheap and passive exposure to mutual fund managers or pooled investment vehicles can be easily obtained through ad hoc investment programs (e.g. TIAA-CREF). Table 3 turns to alternative assets where we would expect investment expertise and networks to play a larger role than in public markets. Using only expertise measures, regression 1 reveals that both expertise in asset management (public securities) and alternatives are significantly linked to higher allocations to alternatives. This is the mirror image of the patterns seen in Table 2 for allocations to domestic equities and fixed income. The results suggest that expertise in investment management (either public or private) is associated with higher allocations to alternatives. When we introduce all variables except for endowment size (regression 2), the expertise effects remain. In addition, having a CIO, a large investment team and a large board all are positively linked to alternative allocation. This is consistent with the skill and infrastructure necessary to deal with asset classes that may involve managing capital calls and liquidity. Once we introduce asset size in regression 3, the positive effect of expertise in alternatives remains; however, the effects of asset management expertise and board size are no longer significant. The patterns in Table 3 show the difficulty of untangling whether it is simply the size of the endowment or some of the characteristics of most large endowments that matter. What is clear is that even controlling for these size related factors, having more expertise in alternative assets is positively and significantly linked to higher allocations to alternative assets as is the presence of a CIO. A 10% increase in the proportion of alternative specialists on the board is associated with a 82 basis points increase in the allocation to alternatives. The presence of a CIO is associated with an almost 4% increase in allocation to alternatives. Taken together these effects show that expertise resident in both the governing board and in the staff (as reflected in the presence of a CIO) goes hand-in-hand with moves to alternative assets. This expertise is specific to alternative assets, not just experience in finance or asset management more generally. These links are consistent with the increased complexity of analyzing and accessing alternative assets compared to public markets. Table 3 finds no significant role for networks. Moreover, it uses a measure of expertise across a spectrum of alternative investments that can be quite different in terms of their liquidity, investment thesis and investment horizon (e.g., hedge funds versus private equity versus venture capital). To explore effects of expertise and networks more thoroughly, we look separately at allocations to hedge funds, to private equity and to venture capital rather than lumping them together. We also use more granular measures of expertise related specifically to a class of assets. Tables 4 through 6 present results. Table 4 focuses on hedge funds whose assets are mostly public securities, unlike the private companies held by private equity and venture capital funds. As in Table 3 , we first introduce measures of expertise and then add other variables in subsequent specifications. Looking across the regressions shows that types of expertise in alternatives are not equal in affecting hedge fund allocations. For instance, controlling for all variables in regression 4, hedge fund expertise remains significantly positively linked to hedge fund allocations, but this is not true for expertise in private equity or venture capital. We also note that the presence of a CIO is not significant nor is our measure of network. We will return to these patterns after considering allocations to private equity and venture capital. Tables 4 through 6 show that the nature of expertise related to allocations is granular and appears tailored to each of the three subsets of alternatives. For hedge fund allocations, expertise in hedge funds matters. A 10% increase in the proportion of members with hedge fund experience is associated with a 1.8% increase in the allocation to hedge funds. Similarly, experience in venture capital is linked to higher venture capital allocations, and private equity expertise matters in private equity. These patterns suggest that expertise does not readily travel across alternative asset classes; rather, investment expertise has elements unique to the particulars of the type of investment.
The results also reveal interesting patterns in the effect of networks and the presence of a CIO on allocations. While the size of the network and the presence of a CIO are significantly positively related to allocations to venture capital and private equity, this is not the case for hedge funds. The size of the investment team seems to matter most for venture capital allocations. These patterns across hedge funds, venture capital, and private equity are consistent with the relative difficulty of managing and accessing these alternative asset classes. Recent trends in hedge fund investing show that allocations to hedge funds have increased across all endowments reflecting easier (and possibly cheaper) access to hedge fund managers. In contrast, private equity investments involve managing capital calls, substantial illiquidity, and assessing management teams who invest in real assets (companies). Venture capital shares the complexity of private equity with the added challenges of the increased riskiness related to new businesses and sometimes restricted access to high performing funds.
Our results suggest that having a CIO and board networks is more important in navigating and accessing the more complex arrangements with private equity and venture capital funds, as compared to hedge fund investing.
Since some endowments (often with smaller amounts of assets) have little or no exposure to private equity and venture capital, we also performed regressions using only endowments that have a positive allocation to the three relevant asset groupings. In addition, we looked at specifications controlling for the percentage of the institution's budget funded by the endowment. Results of all these estimates are qualitatively similar to those reported.
To address concerns about the endogeneity of networks, we estimate a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression using the number of separate industries in which trustees work as an instrument for the network measure. While the number of industries is highly correlated with the number of connections (high F-statistic in the first stage), there is no ex-ante reason to believe that asset allocations across aggregate categories (such as hedge fund, private equity or venture capital) would be linked to trustee exposure across industry sectors in terms of executive or board positions held. Table 7 shows that we still find a positive and significant relationship between networks and allocations to venture capital and private equity.
If anything, networks seem negatively related to hedge fund allocations, likely reflecting the role networks play in shifts toward private equity and venture capital.
3
Overall our results on allocation choices show important roles for the investment experience and networks of an endowment's governing body. These results are true even after controlling for the size of the endowment. Thus, it is not simply scale that seems at work as larger endowments allocate more to alternative assets. In a subsequent section, we explore possible channels for these effects including evidence from a survey. Table 8 shows endowment returns and Sharpe ratios. In addition, the last column reports "selection" returns; these estimate the ability to invest with high performing managers and are calculated as the endowment's return minus a benchmark obtained by multiplying its actual allocation weights times index returns for each asset class. As a comparison, Table 8 also includes a hypothetical passive strategy of avoiding alternative assets and having investment spread across domestic equity (50%), fixed income (30%) and international equity (20%).
Endowment Investment Performance
Echoing Figure 1 shown earlier, column 1 of advantage larger endowments have in total returns (column 1).
The patterns in Table 8 are consistent with larger endowments gaining return advantages from both allocation and selection decisions. Higher allocations to alternatives may allow harvesting illiquidity premia from an asset class. In addition, endowments appear to have some ability to earn extra returns from investing with good managers within an asset class, and this is especially true for large endowments.
To study performance more carefully, we first use Sharpe ratios (which adjust for risk)
using the same regression approach as applied to allocations. Table 9 shows that after controlling for endowment characteristics (including size), expertise in venture capital remains significantly linked to better investment performance as measured by Sharpe ratios. This effect holds even though portfolio performance aggregates results across a range of asset classes, thus making it harder to pick up effects related to a specific asset class.
Next we look at selection. Ideally, we would analyze selection returns granularly; for instance, looking directly at an endowment's return on an asset class compared to an index for that asset class. While endowments routinely report a full set of asset allocation weights, unfortunately, some report returns to NACUBO only at the portfolio level. And even when they break out components, they often only report a return for a broad category such as alternatives, rather than segmenting further. For instance, if we require that the endowment reported its return on alternatives, our sample size drops by over half. To navigate these issues, we first present results based on selection at the portfolio level in which we can use our entire sample. We then present results measuring selection within alternatives for those endowments who report a selection return.
4 Using selection at the portfolio level, the first three regressions of Table 10 show that no variables have significant coefficients except for size. A slightly different story emerges when we look at selection within alternatives in the right part of the table. Both size and venture capital expertise are significant and positively linked to selection returns within alternatives.
One reason the two measures of selection used in Table 10 might give different results is that portfolio performance aggregates results across a range of asset classes, thus making it harder to pick up effects related to a specific asset class. Another possible reason is differences in properties of the two samples. To see if the different signals in Table 10 about the role of venture capital expertise are due to sample differences, we also estimated portfolio selection regressions based only on the smaller sample that reported alternative returns. The results (unreported) were essentially the same as for the larger sample. This suggests that the differing findings are more likely due to the power of our tests than to sample differences.
Table 10 thus provides limited evidence that venture capital expertise increases selection returns. Moreover, Table 9 shows higher Sharpe ratios accompany venture capital expertise, even having controlled for size. These findings are broadly consistent with prior research finding that venture capital investing benefited endowments (Lerner et al. (2008) , Sensoy et al. (2014) ). It is also consistent with findings on the large importance of selection in venture capital where a few fund returns have spectacular returns; simply matching benchmark returns requires getting into some "top quartile" funds which may have limited access (Harris et al. (2016) , Harris et al. (2018) The decrease in the number of funds that report return figures is explained by the fact that (a) many endowments have simply a zero-asset allocation to certain type of investments (private equity and venture capital for instance), and hence there is no return for these asset classes; and (b) institutions selectively do not report return figures (although less likely), or simply do not know the return breakdown. However, approximately 60 percent of endowments that have positive asset allocation to private equity or venture capital report return figures too, and three-fifths report hedge fund returns.
relationships, significant market knowledge, and an extensive network. Over the past twenty years, the venture capital program has earned an outstanding 106.3% per annum. (Yale Endowment Annual Report, 2017) As discussed above, Tables 9 and 10 show that expertise in venture capital is associated with better portfolio performance for endowments. However, there is substantial heterogeneity among endowments. For instance, a sophisticated and investment-savvy board might be more relevant for endowments without a CIO who might bring expertise. While Tables 9 and 10 control for a CIO and whether the school is public or private, we investigate this issue further. We partition the sample based on whether the endowment has a CIO and on whether it is public or private. We then repeat the regressions for both Sharpe ratios and for selection returns. The results (unreported) suggest that venture capital expertise is most strongly related to performance (both in Sharpe ratios and selection) for private schools who do not have a CIO. Regressions based on that set of schools show significant coefficients on venture capital expertise, while coefficients on other measures of expertise and network are not. This area seems promising for future research in understanding the various contributions of the board and staff to endowment performance.
Channels of Effect on the Investment Process
Endowment governance covers the larger system by which the endowment is managed, directed, controlled and monitored. We examine possible channels by which the endowment's investment process may benefit from the financial expertise and networks resident in governing bodies.
Use of Funds
One potential benefit of expertise and networks would be the avoidance of extra fees associated with additional layers of financial intermediation. For instance, investments in direct private equity funds (which own private companies) are illiquid, relatively undiversified, not easily scaled, and have high search and monitoring costs. Given the costs and frictions in direct fund investment, funds of funds (FoFs) provide a second level of intermediation with specialized expertise and services for investing in direct funds. But these benefits come at the cost of additional fees paid to FoFs. In alternative assets such as private equity, FoF fees can be substantial, unlike the low cost alternatives for index funds in public securities (see Harris et al. (2018) ).
We hypothesize that an endowment with extensive expertise and networks would be better able to navigate direct fund investing in alternative assets and hence avoid the extra fees from FoFs. To examine this possibility, we take advantage of NACUBO data which reports the number of separate direct funds and FoFs an endowment uses to invest in alternative strategies.
The count is across all alternative strategies, and, unfortunately, does not distinguish between marketable alternatives (such as hedge funds) and non-marketable alternatives (such as private equity, venture capital, and real assets). We regress the number of funds (separately for direct funds and FoFs) on the natural logarithm of total assets, networks, experience, and all the controls used in sections 3 and 4. Since we have count data and the distribution is highly right-skewed, we use a negative binomial regression.
5 The first regression in Table 11 shows that the number of direct funds is positively and significantly related to an endowment's size, expertise in alternatives on its board, and the presence of a CIO. The second regression splits out expertise in the more granular fashion and suggests that the effect of expertise in VC and private equity is most pronounced on the use of direct funds. The third and fourth regressions use FoFs as the dependent variable. They show limited evidence that expertise is negatively linked to the use of FoFs. In regression 4, for instance, the coefficients on expertise in VC and PE are negatively related to the use of FoFs (significant at the 5% and 10% level).
Moreover, having a large investment staff goes hand-in-hand with fewer FoFs (also significant at the 1% level). Overall, the results in Table 11 support our conjecture: more expertise seems to give endowments an edge is accessing direct funds. This, in turn, relieves the need to invest in FoFs and pay the extra fees that FoFs charge. The finding that expertise in VC and PE matters more in the regressions is consistent with needed skills to navigate investing in these non-marketable assets compared to marketable alternatives such as hedge funds.
Survey Evidence
To shed additional light on the role for governance in the investment process, we conducted a novel survey of endowment boards and managers. The 132 responding institutions represent almost 20% of university endowments represented in the NACUBO-Commonfund data, and collectively manage more than 60% of total market value as of 2015. About three-fifths of the respondents are CIOs, CFOs, or senior investment directors. Over a third of the respondents had 15 or more years of service with the current endowment fund, and over 70 percent of respondents had five or more years of service. We asked a variety of questions (both quantitative and qualitative) related to the investment process.
Overwhelmingly, respondents felt that expertise on the investment committee was useful for the endowment. When asked about the following statement, "the fund's investment process and decisions benefit substantially from the expertise of the committee," 83 percent somewhat or strongly agreed and almost half strongly agreed. Moreover, committee members with investment management experience play a key role; over 71 percent of respondents somewhat or strongly agreed with the statement, "investment committee members with the most investment management experience have a large influence on committee decisions and interactions with investment staff." Less than 10 percent disagreed (the remainder neither agreeing nor disagreeing). Our survey also confirmed the crucial role that IC members play in an endowment's asset allocation. 90 percent of respondents said the committee was important in setting the fund's strategic asset allocation policy, with over 70 percent strongly agreeing.
For two-thirds of the endowments, the committee was also important in determining tactical asset allocation (e.g., specific allocations within a policy range).
Turning to manager selection, the survey revealed a range of approaches with nuances related to individual circumstances. In terms of a formal process, 66 percent report that the IC approves managers, but in only 27 percent of cases did the IC interview them. More typically, the IC, based on recommendations made by consultants or staff, approves who conducts the interviews. In some (typically larger) endowments, staff has full discretion to hire managers, often within guidelines. Most respondents agree that the investment committee is not involved in the day-to-day investment management process. This is especially true for larger endowments with full time staff. That said, there is substantial interaction with staff.
Asked the question "how often do committee members interact with senior investment staff (including CIO) outside of regularly scheduled meetings?", over 60 percent of respondents reported that it happened once or more a month; 47 percent cited one to three times monthly, 10 percent said four to nine times, and four percent said more than ten times monthly.
Further, the larger the fund, the more frequent this interaction. Endowments with one to three interactions per month had median assets of $286 million, compared to only $60 million for those with less than one interaction per month. Almost all respondents (93.5%) felt that the level of interaction was appropriate and none thought it too much. 6% of respondents consider the level of interaction as too little.
In tandem with the formal committee process for manager selection, many endowments report roles for IC members in making recommendations. When asked the question, "how often do committee members provide information on potential investment recommendations to the investment staff and leave it up to staff to do due diligence and make decisions?", only 22 percent responded "never." For 43 percent the response was "rarely," 30 percent "occasionally," and 6 percent "frequently." Most of the time, IC members only suggest a recommendation and leave discretion to follow the recommendation. 74 percent responded that IC members never make recommendations that staff is mandated to accept.
Another channel through which IC members affect the investment process is via networks and connections. 56 percent of respondents reported the "committee members facilitate access to investment opportunities that would otherwise be difficult to identify or undertake (e.g., closed or restricted funds)." This help with access is fairly infrequent, however. 34 percent said it happened rarely (less than once a year) and only four percent said it happened more than twice a year.
Overall, our survey shows that members of endowments' governing bodies affect the investment process through a number of channels. In addition to formal policies on asset allocation determined by a board, IC members (especially those with investment expertise)
provide advice and contacts in many endowments. This includes roles in manager selection as well as in establishing contacts with funds that may be hard to access. Such closed or restricted funds are most prevalent in alternative assets such as venture capital or private equity. This contribution of expertise is consistent with our prior empirical findings on asset allocation and the use of funds of funds in alternative assets. We note, however, that there is considerable variation across endowments, often related to size.
To probe more deeply into our survey responses, we use a regression framework. We focus on two questions; the first on "facilitating access" to investments that are hard to access, the second on "providing information on potential investments" to staff. Each question had four possible answers which we coded one through four based on the response (4 being the most frequent occurrence of IC members providing assistance). Table 12 
Conclusions
University endowments provide an especially good laboratory to study how financial expertise and networks affect choices made by and returns to an institutional investor. These endowments often have the institutional flexibility to pursue fairly unrestricted investment opportunities, have a favorable tax status which may reduce frictions in investing, and have a long term (infinite) investment horizon. Moreover, endowments are more likely to be free from external political influence and other constraints facing some large institutional investors.
We find notable differences across endowments in the expertise and networks resident in their governing bodies. Moreover, these differences affect endowment choices regarding asset allocations; more expertise in alternative assets goes with higher allocations to these assets.
These effects are concentrated in alternative assets (such as venture capital, private equity, and hedge funds) to which many endowments have large allocations. Since alternative assets, by their very nature, are likely harder to analyze, manage and access than traded public securities, there is an enhanced role for expertise and networks in alternative assets.
The nature of relevant expertise appears to be geared to subsets of alternative assets.
Expertise in hedge funds matters for allocations to hedge funds but it is expertise in private equity that matters for private equity and expertise in venture capital that matters for venture capital. Consistent with this pattern, we find that having a CIO is positively linked to allocations in private equity and venture capital, both of which involve complexities such as managing capital calls and dealing with illiquidity. These findings suggest that some elements of expertise do not readily travel across different types of alternative assets but are unique to the type of investment. This has broad implications for forming governing bodies and creating staff capabilities for endowments.
Our findings on networks also highlight complexities of investing in some types of assets. We find that connections to investment professionals (networks) matter especially for allocations to private equity and venture capital. This is consistent with networks helping facilitate ways to overcome restrictions or barriers to investing in funds that might otherwise be difficult or impossible to access.
Finally, beyond effects on allocation, we document that more expertise is associated with better performance for an endowment's portfolio. The improved investment performance comes through a number of channels: capturing higher returns that can accompany alternative assets in general, greater ability to select or have access to high performing managers, and being able to use direct funds rather than funds of funds which impose an extra layer of fees.
Our results suggest that endowments directly benefit from having experts in alternative investments serving on university boards. The potential benefits seem highest in areas such as private equity and venture capital. , and the asset weighted mean (weighted by the dollar ($) value of the endowment). Size is total endowment assets (in millions of dollars, $M), Annual gifts is the sum of gifts and bequests (in $M). Spending rates are the total spending from the endowment as a percentage of the institution's annual budget (or its total assets). Total net return is an annual figure in percent. Portfolio standard deviation is estimated as the standard deviation of the endowment portfolio return using actual weights and benchmark index variances and co-variances adjusted for illiquidity as explained in the appendix. The Adjusted-Sharpe Ratio is the difference between the endowment annual net return and the annualized 30-day U.S. This table reports OLS regression coefficients and standard errors of the relationship between the share of assets allocated to domestic equity and fixed income, and some university endowmentspecific variables. Independent variables are the natural logarithm of total assets, board size, the de-trended measure of network, the proportion of trustees with experience in finance (banking & insurance), asset management, alternative investments, whether the endowment uses a CIO, where the institution is public or private, and the natural logarithm of the full-time equivalent number of investment professionals at the endowment. Year and state fixed effects are included. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the endowment level. Significance levels are denoted by a ***, **, and *, which corresponds to the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Domestic Equity Fixed Income
(1) (2) (3) This table reports OLS regression coefficients and standard errors of the relationship between the share of assets allocated to alternative investments, and some university endowment-specific variables. Independent variables are the natural logarithm of total assets, board size, the de-trended measure of network, the proportion of trustees with experience in finance (banking & insurance), alternative investments, whether the endowment uses a CIO, and the natural logarithm of the full-time equivalent number of investment professionals at the endowment. Year, public/private, and state fixed effects are included. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the endowment level. Significance levels are denoted by a ***, **, and *, which corresponds to the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) This table reports OLS regression coefficients and standard errors of the relationship between the share of assets allocated to hedge funds, and some university endowment-specific variables. Independent variables are the natural logarithm of total assets, board size, the de-trended measure of network, the proportion of trustees with experience in hedge funds, private equity, venture capital, asset management, whether the endowment uses a CIO, and the natural logarithm of the full-time equivalent number of investment professionals at the endowment. Year, public/private, and state fixed effects are included. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the endowment level. Significance levels are denoted by a ***, **, and *, which corresponds to the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) This table reports OLS regression coefficients and standard errors of the relationship between the share of assets allocated to private equity, and some university endowment-specific variables. Independent variables are the natural logarithm of total assets, board size, the de-trended measure of network, the proportion of trustees with experience in hedge funds, private equity, venture capital, asset management, whether the endowment uses a CIO, and the natural logarithm of the full-time equivalent number of investment professionals at the endowment. Year, public/private, and state fixed effects are included. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the endowment level. Significance levels are denoted by a ***, **, and *, which corresponds to the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) This table reports OLS regression coefficients and standard errors of the relationship between the share of assets allocated to venture capital, and some university endowment specific variables. Independent variables are the natural logarithm of total assets, board size, the de-trended measure of network, the proportion of trustees with experience in hedge funds, private equity, venture capital, asset management, whether the endowment uses a CIO, and the natural logarithm of the full-time equivalent number of investment professionals at the endowment. Year, public/private, and state fixed effects are included. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the endowment level. Significance levels are denoted by a ***, **, and *, which corresponds to the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) This table reports IV 2SLS regression coefficients and standard errors of the relationship between the share of assets allocated to hedge funds, private equity, and venture capital funds, and some university endowment-specific variables. The first stage uses the total number of separate firms a member has worked in as an instrument for his/her total network. Independent variables are the natural logarithm of total assets, board size, the de-trended measure of network, the proportion of trustees with experience in hedge funds, private equity, venture capital, asset management, whether the endowment uses a CIO, and the natural logarithm of the full-time equivalent number of investment professionals at the endowment. Year, public/private, and state fixed effects are included. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the endowment level. Significance levels are denoted by a ***, **, and *, which corresponds to the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This table reports OLS regression coefficients and standard errors of the relationship between the Adjusted-Sharpe Ratio, and some university endowment-specific variables. The Adjusted-Sharpe Ratio is the difference between the endowment annual net return and the annualized 30-day U.S. Treasury bill rate divided by the portfolio standard deviation. Portfolio standard deviation is estimated as the standard deviation of the endowment portfolio return using actual weights and benchmark index variances and covariances adjusted for illiquidity as explained in the appendix. Independent variables are the natural logarithm of total assets, board size, the de-trended measure of network, the proportion of trustees with experience in hedge funds, private equity, venture capital, asset management, whether the endowment uses a CIO, and the natural logarithm of the full-time equivalent number of investment professionals at the endowment. Year, public/private, and state fixed effects are included. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the endowment level. Significance levels are denoted by a ***, **, and *, which corresponds to the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
First
(1) (2) (3) This table reports OLS regression coefficients and standard errors of the relationship between investment performance, and some university endowment-specific variables. Portfolio selection is the total portfolio return above the return calculated using the actual weights multiplied by the benchmark return. Alternative selection is the total alternative return above the return calculated using the actual weights multiplied by the benchmark return. Independent variables are the natural logarithm of total assets, board size, the de-trended measure of network,the proportion of trustees with experience in hedge funds, private equity, venture capital, asset management, whether the endowment uses a CIO, and the natural logarithm of the full-time equivalent number of investment professionals at the endowment. Year, public/private, and state fixed effects are included. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the endowment level. Significance levels are denoted by a ***, **, and *, which corresponds to the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Portfolio Selection Alternative Selection This table reports order probit regression coefficients and standard errors of the relationship between access to investment opportunities difficult to undertake or identify (never, rarely, occasionally and frequently), beneficial effect of the investment committee (strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree or disagree, somewhat agree, strongly agree), impact on investment performance (very negative, negative, no impact, positive and very positive) and some endowment-specific variables. Independent variables are the natural logarithm of total assets, fraction of trustees with alternative investment expertise, and the de-trending network measure. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance levels are denoted by a ***, **, and *, which corresponds to the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Access Recommend for Microsoft, the trustee would be matched with all individuals in BoardEx who had worked for Microsoft. Current employment is the sum of all first order connections through current employment. Education is the sum of all first order connections through higher education.
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The fourth measure is the sum of all first order connections through other organizations such as social clubs, charities, or other nonprofits. Since networks are likely especially important in alternative assets, we construct measures for these areas by aggregating an individualâs connections (through education, employment or social history) to organizations and people in hedge funds, venture capital and private equity. For these measures we exclude connections to trustees of the same university or to individuals working for the same alternative asset firm. To account for time trends, we first regress the count of all connections on a time trend.
We then use the residuals to create a de-trended network measure which is absolute value of the sample minimum plus the natural logarithm of one plus the residual. The empirical findings from this assumption are similar to those using the 2007-2015 period and change none of our conclusions. We also compare university endowments whose board members appear in BoardEx versus those that do not, and confirm that the two samples are similar along several dimensions (e.g. size, total gifts, and spending).
Risk Measures and Sharpe Ratios
A portfolio's Sharpe Ratio for time t is the portfolio's excess return (over and above a risk free rate) per unit of risk and is defined as:
where R t is the portfolio total annual net return (from NACUBO), R f is the risk-free rate (30-day Treasury-bill from CRSP) and SD is the portfolio return's standard deviation. While the returns are readily observable, we must estimate the standard deviation. Since we have a limited time series of annual data for any endowment and endowment asset allocations change over time, we base our standard deviation estimates on returns to benchmark indices, weighted by actual endowment allocations, with adjustments to account for stale and asynchronous prices on illiquid assets. These adjustment effectively increase the estimated standard deviations and correlations of illiquid assets. Specifically, we compute a variance-covariance matrix based on our benchmark indices for each asset class using quarterly data for the period 1995-2015. We follow Getmansky et al. (2004) in adjusting risk estimates and generalize their approach to cover multiple categories of illiquid assets. We use lags of up to four quarters in the estimation. We have a total of eight indices: three for liquid asset classes (SP500, JP Morgan Bond Index and MSCI ACWI), and five for illiquid assets (NCREIF, HFRI, GSCI, VC Cambridge and PE Cambridge). We compute an endowment's standard deviation (at time t) by applying the endowment's asset weights to the estimated variance-covariance matrix from the benchmark indices. An important element of our adjustments is to better reflect the risk of illiquid assets. For instance, after our adjustments the implied beta of venture capital (versus the SP500 index) is 2.09 and its standard deviation is .41 (over twice that of the SP500). Without adjustments, the venture capital beta would appear well below one. When we compute variances and covariances on a rolling window basis during the two decade period, untabulated results show no substantive differences in Sharpe Ratios compared to our main specification which uses the entire period for risk estimation. 
